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I. INTRODUCTION
The merger between America Online (AOL) and Time Warner is almost universally
regarded as a disaster. 1 Announced at the beginning of 2000, the combination was
heralded as ushering in a new age of Internet dominance. After all, AOL—a company
only fifteen years old—was taking a majority stake in the merger with perhaps the
preeminent entertainment and media company of the era. AOL had bought Time Warner!
If further proof of the triumph of clicks over bricks had been necessary, the merger sealed
the deal.
But only two months later, the tech market took its first major hit and never
recovered. AOL, in particular, was a serious casualty. At the end of 2003, shareholders in
AOL Time Warner had lost over $200 billion in equity value. 2 By then the chief
architects of the deal—Time Warner’s Gerald Levin and AOL’s Stephen Case—had left
∗
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on an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks as well to Christine Hurt, Gordon Smith, Victor Fleischer, Douglas
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scholars forum at the Conglomerate. Finally, thanks to Sam Blumoff, Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, and Scott
Moss for very helpful edits.
1. See, e.g., NINA MUNK, FOOLS RUSH IN: STEVE CASE, JERRY LEVIN, AND THE UNMAKING OF AOL
TIME WARNER (2004); KARA SWISHER, THERE MUST BE A PONY IN HERE SOMEWHERE: THE AOL TIME
WARNER DEBACLE AND THE QUEST FOR A DIGITAL FUTURE (2003).
2. MUNK, supra note 1, at 277.
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the company, along with most of the former AOL executives who had initially run the
combined company. 3 Fines paid to the SEC for accounting improprieties topped $300
million, 4 $3 billion will be paid to settle civil class action suits, 5 and in 2002 the
company suffered a historic $99 billion write-down in goodwill. Even the name was
changed—starting out as AOL Time Warner, the company’s board later elected to drop
the “AOL,” as if to purge the stigma. 6 It is no wonder that the merger has been called
“catastrophic,” 7 “the worst deal in history,” 8 and “the champion of all failed mergers.” 9
A deal this big and this bad is bound to have dramatic effects. However, little has
been written about what the deal and its failures mean for corporate law. In my view, the
cultures of the companies, both pre- and post-merger, present a great opportunity to
discuss what “shareholder primacy” actually means in the context of corporate America.
Although by no means universally held, the consensus among prominent corporate law
scholars is that the corporation must be run to maximize shareholder value. This
conclusion is so strongly held that two preeminent scholars have declared that there is no
room for further debate on the subject. 10 However, the notion of shareholder primacy in
practice is something that commentators have left largely unconsidered. What exactly
does it mean to run a company for the sole benefit of the shareholders, and what effects
would this focus have on the life of the company?
The AOL Time Warner merger offers a unique case study for the examination of
this question. As journalistic accounts from books and articles about the merger
demonstrate, the executives at AOL believed in the faith of shareholder primacy. They
focused their efforts almost entirely on the stock price and believed they had a moral
obligation to maximize shareholder value. Time Warner, on the other hand, had a culture
that placed the institution above the shareholder, and journalistic ethics above any
requirement to make short-term profits. The resulting culture clash between the two
companies is instructive. AOL, in its efforts to boost share price, aggressively set and
then met quarterly earnings targets throughout the late 1990s. Executives cared little
about accounting proprieties or long-term client relationships; instead, the focus was
solely on performing up to Wall Street’s expectations. This worship of the shareholder
and the share price led AOL to mislead investors and neglect its core businesses. While
AOL went into the merger thinking its aggressive culture was going to transform the

3. ROBERT F. BRUNER, DEALS FROM HELL: M&A LESSONS THAT RISE ABOVE THE ASHES 275-78
(2005).
4. Carrie Johnson, Time Warner, SEC Settle AOL Fraud Charges, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2005, at E1,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A53801-2005Mar21.html.
5. Richard Siklos, Time Warner Offers $3 Billion to End AOL Hangover, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at
C1.
6. BRUNER, supra note 3, at 287 (noting that the erasure of the AOL name, combined with all of the other
fallout from the merger, “reveal[s] a remarkable wipeout of the vision of the deal’s architects”).
7. ALEC KLEIN, STEALING TIME: STEVE CASE, JERRY LEVIN, AND THE COLLAPSE OF AOL TIME
WARNER 294 (2003).
8. SWISHER, supra note 1, at 9.
9. Gretchen Morgenson, What Are Mergers Good For?, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2005, (Magazine), at 56, 58.
Even The Onion has chimed in. See Ted Turner Sends Self Back in Time to Prevent AOL Time Warner Merger,
THE ONION, Mar. 12, 2003, at 1, 8, available at http://www.theonion.com/content/node/27938.
10. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439
(2001).

BODIE FINAL - SMF.DOC

2006]

9/14/2006 11:00:18 AM

AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy

977

underperforming Time Warner, ultimately AOL executives burned themselves out,
leaving the merged company almost entirely in the hands of Time Warner management.
That management remains ensconced, easily rebuffing recent shareholder efforts to assert
a new direction for the company.
In Part I of the Article, I briefly discuss shareholder primacy as a belief system—
its tenets, its utopian claims, its factions. Part II discusses the history of the two
companies before, during, and after the infamous merger. And Part III attempts to draw
some lessons about the practice of shareholder primacy in corporate life, and the potential
perils of shareholder zealotry.
II. THE PRECEPTS OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
Shareholder primacy is the core concept of U.S. corporate law. Although there
are various approaches to the concept, shareholder primacy generally means that
corporations exist to serve the interests of shareholders. 11 The basic structural component
of shareholder primacy is the right of shareholders to elect the board of directors. 12
Because the board is the locus of final authority within the corporation, the right to
choose the board gives shareholders ultimate authority. In addition, shareholders are
granted rights to vote on essential corporate decisions, such as mergers and the sale of
substantially all of the corporation’s assets. 13 Shareholders are generally given the right
to amend the corporation’s charter, 14 and in some jurisdictions may retain the power to
amend corporate by-laws. 15 In addition, federal regulations permit shareholders to
propose resolutions, 16 and proposed regulations would give shareholders the ability to
use the corporation’s proxy mechanisms in nominating new members for the board. 17
However, the concept of shareholder primacy extends well beyond these
structural mechanisms. Shareholder primacy is a theory—a belief system, if you will—
that maximizing shareholder wealth is in the best interests of society. Scholars have
referred to the notion that corporations should seek primarily, if not solely, to maximize
returns to their shareholders as the shareholder primacy norm 18 or the shareholder wealth
maximization norm. 19 This norm is much more than a descriptive account of
shareholders’ rights; it is instead a normative judgment on the most socially efficient way
of organizing the economy. Proponents of this norm argue that we will maximize our
utility as a society only through a system of corporate law that recognizes and perpetuates
shareholder primacy.

11. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 277 (1998) (“The structure
of corporate law ensures that corporations generally operate in the interests of shareholders.”).
12. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (2004).
13. See, e.g., id. § 251.
14. See, e.g., id. § 242.
15. See, e.g., id. § 109(b). But see OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1013 (2004).
16. Proxy Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2004).
17. See Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding
the Nomination and Election of Directors, [2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,938 (July 15,
2003).
18. Smith, supra note 11, at 278 & n.1.
19. Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to
Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1425 (1993).
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Modern shareholder primacy can be traced back to the seminal work of Adolf Berle
and Gardiner Means: The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 20 This oft-cited 21
work espouses the central tenet of the primacy movement: the separation of ownership
and control in the modern corporation. 22 The corporation is owned by the shareholders
but controlled by management. Resolving the effects of this separation provides the
fundamental koan of modern corporate scholarship. 23
In the 1970s and 1980s economists and corporate law scholars developed the “nexus
of contracts” model for the corporation. 24 Instead of being the “owners” of the
corporation, shareholders were one group of many whose contracts with one another
jointly created the fictional corporate “entity.” 25 However, shareholders were the sole
“residual claimants:” their returns were not payable until the other contractual
participants—creditors, employees, customers, suppliers—had been fully satisfied. 26 To
maximize social wealth, the corporation’s organizing principle needed to be the
maximization of the residual returns payable to shareholders. In this way, all other
claimants received their contractual entitlements, and the shareholders benefited from the
maximization of the residual.
As a norm, shareholder primacy offers guidance to a range of activities. In law,
the notion of shareholder primacy grounds our conception of the corporation itself.
Perhaps the most familiar encapsulation is the following passage from Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co.:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.
The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain
that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of
profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to
devote them to other purposes. 27
According to this formulation, directors are not only elected by shareholders; they are

20. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932).
21. A search for “‘Modern Corporation and Private Property’ and Berle” returned 924 results in the
“Journals and Law Reviews” Database on Westlaw. Cf. Roberto Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law
Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 923 (1984) (“A survey of the literature suggests that the last major work of
original scholarship was Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means' The Modern Corporation and Private Property.”).
22. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 20, at 6.
23. Cf. David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist Reimagination,
92 GEO. L.J. 61, 70 (2003) (referring to “Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means' discussion of the corporation as a
drama enacted between shareholders and management”).
24. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 139 (1991); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976) (suggesting that nature of firm as nexus for
contracting relationships moots discussions of precise corporate boundaries).
25. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 24, at 36.
26. Id. at 36-37. This perspective assumes that all other claimants have rigidly-set contractual
entitlements, such that paying them more would be akin to a gift.
27. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). Despite this oft-quoted expression of the
shareholder primacy norm, Gordon Smith has a persuasive reading of the Dodge case as an example of minority
shareholder oppression. Smith, supra note 11, at 315-20.
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also duty-bound to use their discretion only to select the best way of maximizing
shareholder profits.
Proponents of shareholder primacy thus believe that the law should orient itself to
enforce and reinforce the primacy norm. For example, the norm underlies much of the
scholarly analysis on mergers and acquisitions, particularly hostile takeovers. Since the
early 1980s commentators have debated the legality and wisdom of various techniques
used by boards to fend off or defeat hostile takeover attempts. 28 Devices such as poison
pills, lock-ups, and staggered boards have been sharply criticized for their power to
diminish shareholder value. 29 Shareholder proponents view the market for corporate
control as a useful constraint on managerial opportunism. More importantly, the control
market serves as a way of maximizing shareholder value. 30 Since hostile takeovers are
generally proposed through a tender offer to shareholders, the offer must be attractive to
shareholders to have any chance of success. Defensive techniques are generally a method
of thwarting the shareholders’ desire (either actual or predicted) to take part in the offer.
These techniques thereby threaten to diminish shareholders’ returns in the interest of
managerial self-protection. 31
The clearest victory for shareholder primacy in the law of mergers and
acquisitions is Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 32 In Revlon, the
court held that directors have a duty to maximize shareholder returns when conducting an
auction for the sale of control of the corporation. 33 Once the sale of the company was
ensured, “[t]he duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a
corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders'
benefit.” 34 In other words, the duty of the directors was “getting the best price for the
stockholders at a sale of the company.” 35
Shareholder primacy has had less success in other areas of takeover law. The
Paramount v. Time, Inc. 36 case is a noted counter-example; in that case, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that Time could legally structure a combination with Warner
Brothers to avoid a shareholder vote. Such evasive actions were necessary as Paramount
had offered Time shareholders $200 a share, well above the roughly $110 a share at
which the shares had been trading. The court stated that “absent a limited set of
circumstances as defined under Revlon, a board of directors, while always required to act
28. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Larry E. Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the
Corporate Contract, 78 GEO. L.J. 71 (1989); Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory
of the Shareholder Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261 (2001).
29. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover
Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002); Julian Velasco, The
Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 J. CORP. L. 381 (2002).
30. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 24, at 113 (“Self-interest thus assures us that changes of
corporate control, like other voluntary exchanges, move assets to higher valued uses.”).
31. Corporate constituency statutes allow the board to consider non-shareholder constituencies such as
employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and even communities in making decisions in the course of a
proposed merger or acquisition. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 717(b) (2005).
32. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
33. Id. at 185.
34. Id. at 182.
35. Id.
36. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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in an informed manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the
short term, even in the context of a takeover.” 37 The court also recognized that the board
may take into account a variety of factors in defending against a hostile takeover,
including “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders.” 38 More generally,
over thirty states have passed corporate constituency statutes that expressly allow
directors to consider non-shareholder interests, particularly in the takeover context. 39
Despite mixed evidence about the law’s relationship to shareholder primacy, the
legal academy has undoubtedly embraced this norm. 40 The bulk of corporate scholars
agree that shareholder wealth maximization is the most socially efficient organizing
principle for corporate law. In fact, many of the contemporaneous debates over corporate
policy take the norm as the starting point, and then wrestle over the best way of achieving
it. Recent scholarly acceptance of defensive mechanisms, such as the poison pill, for
example, has come not from an embrace of managerialism, but rather from the notion that
poison pills may actually help boards achieve maximum value for their shareholders.41
Similarly, longtime shareholder primacist Stephen Bainbridge has recently adopted a
model of director primacy, in which he describes the board of directors as “a sui generis
body—a sort of Platonic guardian—serving as the nexus for the various contracts
comprising the corporation.” 42 However, he still believes shareholder wealth
maximization should be the goal of the firm; director primacy is simply the best method
of attaining it. 43
As the dispute over the best means to effectuate the norm demonstrates,
shareholder primacy is the dominant normative theory of the corporation. As Kraakman
and Hansmann put it in their “end-of-days” article: “There is no longer any serious
competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term
shareholder value.” 44 While acknowledging the argument that this dominance may prove
“ephemeral,” 45 they argue that the logic of the model’s efficiency, along with the
performance of shareholder-based economies, will dictate the model’s continued
success. 46 The increasing size of the shareholder class in the United States, Europe, and
Japan will bring additional converts to the cause. 47 Ultimately, Kraakman and Hansmann
conclude: “The triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over its
principal competitors is now assured, even if it was problematic as recently as twenty37. Id. at 1150.
38. Id. at 1153 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)).
39. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 737
(2005).
40. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 791, 798 n.35 (2002) (“Today, most corporate law scholars embrace some variant of shareholder
primacy.”).
41. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 577 (2003); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (2002).
42. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U.
L. REV. 547, 550-51 (2003).
43. Id. at 550; Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 794-95.
44. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10, at 439.
45. Id. at 450.
46. Id. at 449-51.
47. Id. at 451-53.
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five years ago.” 48
However, one issue has remained problematic to shareholder primacists, even in
the face of such dominance in the marketplace of ideas. Ultimately, shareholder primacy
is about the governing principles behind the corporation. However, there is very mixed
evidence about whether those who actually run corporations believe in shareholder
primacy. In assessing this question, Gordon Smith determined that “the influence of the
shareholder primacy norm on ordinary business decisions is an empirical question not
susceptible to a ready answer.” 49 Nevertheless, Smith noted that at least one study of
director behavior found “widespread ambivalence” about shareholder primacy. 50
According to the study, most directors balanced many constituencies when making
corporate decisions. 51 In a similar vein, Lynn Stout has noted the prevalence of a variety
of powerful tools against hostile takeover efforts and tender offers. 52 These tools are
antithetical to shareholders’ rights advocates, and yet they are found in most corporations.
Recent studies demonstrate the continued popularity of poison pills and classified boards,
even though these devices arguably lessen shareholder value. 53 If corporations and their
directors were truly oriented toward shareholder primacy, goes the argument, then such
devices would be far less common. Overall, there is significant evidence that firms are
oriented toward managerial or stakeholder prerogatives in making corporate decisions.
One area in which shareholder primacy has influenced corporate behavior is
executive compensation. In an influential article in the Harvard Business Review,
Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy argued that executive compensation should be
directly linked to the value of the firm’s shares. 54 Instead of worrying that CEO pay was
too high, the authors contended that firms must make sure that their CEO’s incentives
were aligned with those of the shareholders. Instruments such as stock options were wellsuited to give executives an incentive to pay attention to stock price. Stock options, in
fact, amounted to a win-win for shareholders: executives would only profit from them
when the shareholders had profited as well. Jensen and Murphy’s hypothesis was
influential in the legal academy and remains so. 55 But their ideas also changed the shape

48. Id. at 468.
49. Smith, supra note 11, at 290.
50. Id. (citing JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF
AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 38 (1989)).
51. Id. at 290-91.
52. Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189,
1206 (2002).
53. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 29, at 895 (“Today, among a sample of 2,421
large public U.S. companies, 59% have staggered boards.”); Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO
Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Provisions in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 85 (2001) (finding
that roughly two-thirds of sampled IPO charters had antitakeover provisions).
54. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentive—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, 68
HARV. BUS. REV. 138 (1990).
55. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance,
114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1539 (2005) (“Because executive loans in many cases appear to serve their purpose of
increasing managerial stock ownership, thereby aligning managers' and shareholders' interests, the blanket
prohibition of executive loans in [the Sarbanes-Oxley Act] is self-evidently a public policy error.”). Even
Lucien Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, critics of current executive compensation policies, agree that compensation
should be tied to the corporation’s stock performance. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 19-20 (2004).
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of executive compensation. Between 1980 and 1994, the percentage of CEOs holding
stock options in their firm increased from 30% to almost 70%.56 In 1996, CEOs at 111 of
the nation’s 200 largest companies had received stock option packages valued at over $10
million. 57 Stock options were truly the pay revolution of the late twentieth century. 58
As will be discussed below, stock options were an important part of the culture at
AOL—a culture that seems to have been shaped by the precepts of the shareholder
primacy norm. The AOL-Time Warner merger thus presents a unique opportunity. As
developed further below, the companies involved in the merger reflected two schools of
corporate thought: AOL embodied the shareholder primacy model, and Time Warner
followed a more traditional managerialist path. The fate of these companies before,
during, and after the merger provides some evidence about the effects of these models
when applied to actual corporate governance.
III. THE AOL-TIME WARNER MERGER: A TALE OF TWO ORTHODOXIES
If one were looking to compare the differences between the traditional
“managerialist” or “stakeholder” theory of the corporation and the “shareholder primacy”
norm, perhaps no two companies could provide better examples of each approach than
Time Warner and America Online. Time Warner and its predecessor, Time Inc., were
companies that had consistently hearkened back to the importance of company traditions
of journalistic integrity and excellence. In fact, this mission had clearly risen above any
commitment Time might have had to its shareholders. In contrast, America Online
immersed itself in the boom of the go-go 1990s, and eventually organized its business
largely to facilitate an ever-increasing stock price. The merger of these companies thus
provided a clash of cultures—a clash that was won initially by AOL, but now sees Time
Warner reigning triumphant. Before discussing the merger, however, I begin by talking
more in depth about the different companies and their cultures before the merger.
A. Time Warner and the Protection of Corporate Culture
Born to American missionaries in China, Henry Robinson Luce founded Time
Incorporated with a sense of mission and moral certainty. 59 Its premier product, Time
Magazine, became immensely popular for its relatively shorter articles with a crisp,
distinctive style. Soon thereafter, the company introduced Fortune, Life, and Sports
Illustrated to the American scene. 60 Although financially successful, Luce saw the
company’s primary mission as its journalistic enterprise. Rather than taking the title of
“chairman” or “president,” Luce referred to himself as “editor in chief” of the
company. 61 The locus of power within the company was the editorial staff; Time

56. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 653,
663 (1998).
57. See Rachel Emma Silverman, Your Career Matters: The Jungle, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1999, at B18.
58. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE CRASH: THE GREAT BUBBLE AND ITS UNDOING 15 (2004)
(noting that Jensen and Murphy’s “call to arms . . . reverberated in the counsels of compensation consultants”).
59. MUNK, supra note 1, at 3.
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id. at 9.
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employees on the business side were sometimes referred to as “galley slaves.” 62 In fact,
moneymaking was seen as somewhat undignified. 63 Although Luce recognized the
importance of returning value to his shareholders, he did not see that as the overriding
mission of the corporation. “Time Incorporated is now, and is expected to continue to be,
principally a journalistic enterprise,” Luce said, “and, as such, an enterprise operated in
the public interest as well as in the interest of its stockholders.” 64
Even after Luce’s passing, Time, Inc. continued to have a strong corporate culture
devoted to its journalistic traditions. Luce’s handpicked successor, Andrew Heiskell,
admitted that he didn’t know what a balance sheet was when he started his job. 65 Later
leaders of Time made greater efforts to accommodate Wall Street; Nick Nicholas, who
took over in 1986, made a greater return on equity his highest priority. 66 However,
Time’s culture and traditions stayed strong. In fact, former CEO Gerald Levin has noted
that Time possesses an “immunological system” that rejects influences from outsiders. 67
It was the power of that culture that drove perhaps the most famous takeover
controversy of the late 1980s takeover boom. In 1987, Time and Warner
Communications, home of the famous Warner Brothers Studio, began merger talks.
Nicholas and his right hand man at the time, Gerald Levin, were convinced that Time
needed a “transforming transaction” to bring it into the new world of media and
entertainment convergence. 68 After talking with Stephen Ross, CEO and Chairman of
Warner, the Time executives moved forward with plans for a merger. But many at Time,
particularly board members, were worried about the clash of cultures involved. The board
eventually agreed to the deal, but on the condition that Time’s culture would remain
intact. 69 The leadership of the combined company was structured so that, after a period
of co-CEOs, Nicholas would take over the combined company and Ross would retire. 70
After two years of negotiations, the companies announced plans for a stock-for-stock
merger.
Two weeks before the shareholders voted on the merger, Paramount
Communications sprung a surprise $175 tender offer for Time, Inc. shares. The offer was
soon upped to $200. The Time leadership was stunned. Their carefully planned merger
was threatened with an outright buyout of the company. And even though the Time board
members had concerns about the corporate culture at Warner, they had much greater
concerns about Paramount. 71 Moreover, the Paramount buyout would have nothing to
ensure the preservation of Time’s corporate culture through its continued control of the
company. Time executives saw that the survival of their company (as well as their jobs)
was at stake.
To avoid a shareholder vote, which might very well defeat the merger, Time and
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. MUNK, supra note 1, at 3.
65. Id. at 26.
66. Id. at 30.
67. Id. at 31.
68. Id.
69. MUNK, supra note 1, at 36.
70. Id. at 36-37.
71. Id. at 37 (noting that Time executives viewed Paramount CEO Martin Davis as an “unprincipled
parvenu” and a “son of a bitch”).
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Warner restructured their merger as a buyout of Warner by Time. Warner was a
significantly larger company, and Time would have to take on a massive amount of debt
to buy out the Warner shareholders at a generous price. But the buyout would allow the
merger to go forward without a Time shareholders’ vote. 72 The board and executive
structure would remain the same as had been worked out in the merger. Although a
drastically different method of combination from a financial perspective, the buyout was
essentially a way of preserving the merger by avoiding Time shareholders.
Paramount, as well as some Time shareholders, sued to block the buyout. Such a
buyout was, in their eyes, a blatant effort to contravene shareholder preferences to
preserve executives’ positions and powers. However, in decisions that surprised and
dismayed many corporate commentators, both the Delaware Court of Chancery and the
Delaware Supreme Court refused to enjoin the buyout. Essential to these decisions was
the notion that Time, Inc. had a special “culture” that the board was seeking to protect. In
his discussion of Time’s long range strategic planning, Chancellor Allen noted that the
company had manifested “a desire to maintain an independent Time Incorporated that
reflected a continuation of what management and the board regarded as distinctive and
important ‘Time culture.’” 73 Allen found that: “This culture appears in part to be pride in
the history of the firm—notably Time Magazine and its role in American life—and in part
a managerial philosophy and distinctive structure that is intended to protect journalistic
integrity from pressures from the business side of the enterprise.” 74 In fact, Allen stated
that: “The mission of the firm is not seen by those involved with it as wholly economic,
nor the continued existence of its distinctive identity as a matter of indifference.”75
Despite this, Allen found that “there is insufficient basis to suppose at this juncture that
such concerns have caused the directors to sacrifice or ignore their duty to seek to
maximize in the long run financial returns to the corporation and its stockholders.”76
Finding the combination to be a reasonable response to hostile tactics, Allen denied the
motion to enjoin the buyout.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. It echoed Allen’s findings, stating that:
“The record attests to the zealousness of Time's executives, fully supported by their
directors, in seeing to the preservation of Time’s ‘culture,’ i.e., its perceived editorial
integrity in journalism.” 77 In upholding Time’s efforts to avoid a shareholder vote, the
court noted: “Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate
plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the
corporate strategy.” 78
The Delaware Supreme Court thus pitched the Paramount v. Time decision as a
victory for long-term corporate interests over short-term shareholder profiteering. But
72. The structure of the buyout was as follows: “Time would make an immediate all-cash offer for 51% of
Warner's outstanding stock at $70 per share. The remaining 49% would be purchased at some later date for a
mixture of cash and securities worth $70 per share.” Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1148 (Del. 1989).
73. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time, Inc., Civil Action Nos. 10866, 10670, and 10935, 1989 WL
79880, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989).
74. Id.
75. Id. at *7.
76. Id.
77. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1152.
78. Id. at 1154.
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many viewed the decision as a triumph of managerialism over shareholders’ rights. The
overwhelming response from commentators was criticism of the decision. 79
Shareholders’ advocate Robert A.G. Monks described the case as “the greatest incursion
in United States business history into the rights of shareholders.” 80 In contrast, Gerald
Levin recently described the decision like this: “What a beautiful thing.” 81
After the merger, Time executives consolidated their power over the combined
company, although Levin, not Nicholas, emerged as the new CEO. 82 Levin continued to
pursue a growth strategy, expanding cable operations and acquiring Turner Broadcasting
in 1995. 83 However, Time Warner’s internal efforts to break into electronic commerce
and the Internet resulted in failure. 84 By the end of the decade, Levin was looking for
another “transforming transaction” to bring the company into the digital age.
B. America Online: From Internet Evangelism to Profit Maximization
America Online began its life as a humble startup hawking an application for the
Atari 2600 video game system. 85 The company, then known as Control Video
Corporation, had been founded by “serial entrepreneur” Bill Von Meister in the early
1980s. 86 After the Atari application flamed out, the company switched to online services
and reincorporated as Quantum Computer Services. 87 The original online service, known
as Q-Link, soon developed a devoted following and eventually was renamed America
Online. 88 By the mid-1980s, the company was being run by James Kimsey as CEO and
Stephen Case as his second in command. Case was responsible for perhaps the most
important deal in the company’s early history: an exclusive deal to manage an online
service for Apple Computer. 89 By the late 1980s, Case had established himself as the de
facto head of the company. In 1991, he became CEO. 90
As leader and CEO, Case was known for his grand, almost messianic vision. Case
had an “unshakable” belief in the future of the company and its services. 91 For him, the
purpose of the company was the promotion of this new method of interactivity—a new
mode of human contact. He cultivated this sense of mission amongst his employees. As
one AOL executive put it: “To the people at AOL, AOL is not just a company, it’s a

79. Cf. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1009, 1075 (1997) (“The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Time-Warner was widely viewed as the
complete undermining of Revlon and as an endorsement of the ‘just-say-no’ defense.”).
80. ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 350 (2d ed. 2001).
81. MUNK, supra note 1, at 40.
82. Id. at 43-44.
83. Id. at 54.
84. KLEIN, supra note 7, at 69-78; SWISHER, supra note 1, at 90-94.
85. SWISHER, supra note 1, at 25.
86. Id. at 24-25.
87. Id. at 28-29.
88. Id. at 31-32.
89. MUNK, supra note 1, at 77.
90. Id. at 78. Case was forced to step down briefly prior to the company’s IPO in 1992, due to concerns
about his youth and inexperience. Id.; SWISHER, supra note 1, at 33-34. However, he was reinstated later in
1992.
91. MUNK, supra note 1, at 71.
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religion. If AOL is your religion, Steve is your spiritual leader.” 92 Particularly in the
early years, Case rejected opportunities to cash out to pursue his long-term vision. One
critical moment was a $50 million buy-out offer from CompuServe, then the market
leader in online services. Then-CEO Kimsey was interested in the offer, but Case
adamantly insisted on rejecting it. 93 For him, the company’s mission was more important
than selling out at a high price. 94
Admittedly, there was an underside to the highfalutin’ rhetoric. Commentators
believe that AOL’s early growth was due, in large part, to members engaged in emailing,
chatting, and even exchanging e-files all about sex. Unlike other online providers, AOL
was happy to let its users indulge in these activities, and, as a result, it soon surpassed its
rivals. 95 In addition, the company used questionable accounting practices for new
subscribers and marketing revenue to improve its short-term financials. These practices
would lead to a $385 million write-off in 1996, and accusations that the company was
“morally bankrupt.” 96
During the 1990s, the Internet changed from a fad to the future. And America
Online changed from a dalliance for the few into the primary vehicle for America to get
online. Along the way, the company suffered inevitable growing pains from its incredible
expansion. After surviving the initial effort by Microsoft to enter the market, AOL surged
in popularity when it chose to go to a flat-fee system. 97 However, the company was illequipped for the jump in usage, leading to blackouts and widespread busy signals. 98
Although Case had been a superb visionary, there was increasing consensus that AOL
needed a new CEO who could handle these very different circumstances. 99 The focus on
membership had come at a cost to the bottom line, and Wall Street prognosticators were
itching to finally see the company make a profit. 100 To appease these concerns, in
October 1996, AOL hired Robert Pittman to manage the daily operations of the
company. 101
Known to some as Bob “Pitchman,” Pittman was well-known for co-founding
MTV and managing the Six Flags amusement parks for Time Warner. 102 Although he
had been enormously successful in these ventures, Pittman had acquired a reputation as

92. Id. One former executive described his AOL experience like this: “There are very few times in your
business life that you truly believe with a capital B. When it happens, it’s like your first love—you never forget
it. You never forget the time you really, really frickin’ believed.” Id. at 80.
93. Id. at 77; SWISHER, supra note 1, at 32-33.
94. Kimsey later reported that he would have taken the offer if CompuServe had offered $60 million.
SWISHER, supra note 1, at 33.
95. Or, as Wall Street Journal reporter Kara Swisher opined, AOL outdistanced rivals like Prodigy
“precisely because on AOL someone could type the word f[***].” Id. at 41.
96. Id. at 56-57 (quoting short seller David Rocker). Former CEO Kimsey described the accounting issue
as “the big turd” that “sat in the middle of the company and smelled up the place.” Id. at 57. Short-seller Rocker
claimed that for AOL, “every revenue is ordinary, and every expense is extraordinary.” Id.
97. MUNK, supra note 1, at 84.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 83-84.
100. SWISHER, supra note 1, at 49-50.
101. MUNK, supra note 1, at 84; SWISHER, supra note 1, at 52. Pittman was hired as president of AOL
Networks. Id.
102. SWISHER, supra note 1, at 53-54.
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being “more interested in short-term fixes than in long-term solutions.” 103 Upon taking
the job, Pittman brought a new sensibility to AOL: a focus on earnings estimates and
greater profitability. 104 He implemented aggressive financial goals and immediately
slashed costs. In a move known as the “November ’96 Massacre,” AOL under Pittman
announced its first large-scale layoffs. 105 Perhaps most importantly, Pittman opened up
advertising as a profit stream for the company.
Prior to Pittman, AOL had focused on subscription fees rather than advertising as
its profit base. 106 In fact, AOL employees generally thought of advertising as “anathema”
to the community feel they were trying to create. 107 This discomfort with advertising
extended all the way up to the top. Myer Berlow, AOL’s advertising chief, had been hired
in 1995 but initially hit resistance when he tried to execute his plans. For example, after
Berlow had secured one of his first major deals, Case requested that the purchased ad be
put where members wouldn’t see it. 108 Another time, after requesting that a customer’s
ad be placed on the site, Berlow was told by a technology manager that advertising was
“a bad idea, generally.” 109 However, under Pittman all that changed. In fact, Pittman’s
AOL would be “all about making money through its ad deals.” 110 The harbinger of
change was a $100 million deal with a start-up long-distance company named Tel-Save
Holdings. 111 For its $100 million, Tel-Save became the exclusive advertiser on AOL for
long-distance service. 112 Although a shockingly high amount to pay, the deal boosted
Tel-Save stock to new heights, giving the company a $2 billion market capitalization. 113
And in the process, AOL became a star as well.
Over the next four years, AOL would establish itself as the premier Internet
advertising placement. New Internet start-ups were willing to pay almost any price to
ensure that they got AOL “eyeballs” directed to their sites, and AOL’s team made sure
that they did, in fact, pay almost any price. The advertising group, headed by Berlow,
took an extremely aggressive approach. Dubbing himself the “Darth Vader of AOL,”
Berlow and his two-hundred odd salespeople were responsible for attracting potential
clients. 114 Once they had been baited with offers of exclusivity and placement, clients
would hammer out the final deal with AOL’s Business Affairs department, known as
“BA.” If Berlow had a harsh reputation within AOL, BA was notorious outside of it.
Headed by David Colburn, a swashbuckling executive who wore cowboy boots, the BA
team sought to squeeze every last penny out of potential advertisers. 115 At the time, AOL
had the market power to do so. For the start-ups, an AOL placement created the

103. Id. at 54.
104. MUNK, supra note 1, at 84; SWISHER, supra note 1, at 54.
105. MUNK, supra note 1, at 85.
106. Id. at 97.
107. SWISHER, supra note 1, at 61.
108. MUNK, supra note 1, at 100.
109. Id. at 99.
110. SWISHER, supra note 1, at 61.
111. MUNK, supra note 1, at 101; SWISHER, supra note 1, at 62.
112. MUNK, supra note 1, at 102.
113. Id. at 103.
114. Id. at 109; SWISHER, supra note 1, at 61.
115. One AOL employee referred to BA as having a “shit-kicking, hulking, bravado culture.” MUNK, supra
note 1, at 114.
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credibility necessary to launch a successful IPO. 116 So AOL could afford to indulge BA’s
“scorched-earth” negotiating tactics. 117 Such tactics included changing deal terms at the
last minute, promising one thing and then retracting it down the road, and openly
negotiating with competitors to keep everyone off balance. 118 BA executives, particularly
Colburn, even had a reputation for enjoying this process; they were known for taking
pleasure in causing their clients pain. 119
Such aggressive deal-making boosted AOL’s profits, and thereby its stock price.
Pittman and the other AOL executives were extremely successful in maximizing AOL’s
stock price by consistently beating Wall Street’s targets for revenues and earnings. And
to AOL employees, maximizing stock price was not some ephemeral goal. Prior to
Pittman’s tenure, working at AOL had not been that financially rewarding. Steve Case’s
annual salary had only been $200,000 for years. 120 Like many Internet and technology
companies at the time, however, AOL offered its employees generous stock option
packages. 121 As the stock began its astronomical rise from the mid- to late-1990s, AOL
employees noticed. Employees had the stock price displayed in the bottom left hand
corner of their computer screens, as well as on the liquid crystal displays found on
computer printers. 122 In fact, one commentator said that “[b]y 1998, AOL’s stock price
had become the group’s mission, a sacred trust.” 123 AOL executives made a ton of
money; by 1999, four of the Forbes 400 list of richest Americans were AOL’ers. 124 And
AOL executives took advantage of the stock’s growth by regularly selling off significant
chunks of their holdings. 125 However, prosperity was spread throughout the company; by
one count, more than two thousand of the company’s employees were millionaires. 126
Not surprisingly, such potential for wealth was attention-getting. One observer noted:
“To the penny, every AOL employee knew exactly what the stock was trading at.” 127
If there was a downside to this prosperity, it was perhaps a sense that the
company had lost track of its core values. Pittman had done a remarkable job of turning
the company into a profitable, market-dominating presence; as Merrill Lynch analyst

116. Id. at 113; SWISHER, supra note 1, at 116.
117. SWISHER, supra note 1, at 117.
118. Id. at 116.
119. MUNK, supra note 1, at 111-12. Perhaps the best known example of BA tactics was the negotiation
between AOL and Netscape. In 1996, AOL was searching to license an Internet browser, and it had negotiated
extensively with Netscape over such a license. On March 11, AOL and Netscape announced a deal for AOL to
license Netscape’s Navigator browser, a move that was seen as crucial to Netscape’s future. However, the very
next day, AOL announced that Microsoft’s Internet Explorer would be the primary browser for its software;
Netscape users would have to download the Navigator browser. Netscape had believed that its deal would be
exclusive but had never secured exclusivity in the final deal. As a result, Netscape became a “wounded duck”
that was later bought out by AOL. Id. at 108-09.
120. MUNK, supra note 1, at 115.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id; see also KLEIN, supra note 7, at 168 (“It got to the point where employees practically worshipped
at the altar of AOL’s stock.”).
124. MUNK, supra note 1, at 117.
125. SWISHER, supra note 1, at 119.
126. MUNK, supra note 1, at 116.
127. Id. at 202.
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Henry Blodget declared, “AOL is the Internet blue chip.” 128 However, in adapting itself
to the expectations of the market, AOL had grown to place importance on short-term
profitability and stock price. To some, AOL had started out with a profound mission—to
change the world through an incredible new medium—and had ended up handing over
their company to car salesmen. 129 But given the plaudits from Wall Street, as well as the
immense wealth they had generated, no one at AOL seemed too concerned.
C. The Merger
Actually, some AOL folks were concerned. They harbored suspicions that the
incredible valuation might not last forever. In fact, several members of the AOL
leadership urged fast action to leverage their impressive stock valuation into an important
merger or buyout. 130 Beginning in 1999, Case and other AOL executives brainstormed
about potential combinations. Although the company discussed potential mergers with
other Internet companies, such as eBay, or telecom companies, such as AT&T, the team
settled on potential mergers with media conglomerates. 131 Time Warner was at the top of
AOL’s list. So beginning in late 1999, Case began courting Time Warner CEO Gerald
Levin at international events in Paris and Shanghai. Case and Levin talked ideas, and
Case impressed Levin with his big-picture thinking about the global market and the role
of business in society. 132 Prior to this courtship, Levin himself had been intent on
bringing Time Warner into the Internet age—if not by internal advancement, then by
combination or acquisition. And Levin found Case to be “unusually idealistic,” and the
culture at AOL to be “more humanistic” than he had thought. 133 Perhaps AOL was the
company for Levin’s “transformative transaction”—transforming not only the company
but even the global landscape. The good feelings continued over a private dinner between
Case and Levin at the Rihga Royal Hotel. Business, the pair agreed, was not just about
making money; “it was about integrity, and values, and the greater good, and making a
difference.” 134 By the end of the dinner, the merger was on its way.
The two thorniest issues to resolve, not surprisingly, were the share-exchange
ratio and managerial control. Levin was adamant regarding control. Case conceded the
top position upfront; Levin would be CEO and Case would be Chairman of the Board. 135
Otherwise, it would be a “merger of equals”: each company would get eight members on
the board, and Pittman would share the COO position with Time Warner’s Richard
Parsons. 136 But from Case’s perspective, it could not be a merger of equals for the
shareholders. Considering the companies’ market capitalizations, AOL dwarfed Time
Warner. Looking at share prices as of the end of 1999, AOL would have been worth
about sixty-five percent of a combined company to Time Warner’s thirty-five percent. 137
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 119.
Id. at 110.
SWISHER, supra note 1, at 124-25.
Id. at 129-30.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 134.
MUNK, supra note 1, at 142.
Id. at 139-40.
Id. at 144; SWISHER, supra note 1, at 141.
MUNK, supra note 1, at 145.
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True, on other indices Time Warner was much bigger than AOL: 70,000 employees
versus 15,000; $27 billion in revenues versus $5 billion. 138 But AOL’s market valuation
was almost twice as large as Time Warner’s. For the next two months, the two companies
haggled over the exchange ratio, until Levin ultimately agreed to a fifty-five percent split
to AOL and a fourty-five percent split to Time Warner. 139
The public reaction to the merger announcement on January 10, 2000, would
prove the unreliability of conventional wisdom. First, the deal was celebrated as evidence
that the Internet was coming of age. Rather than an end-of-an-era capstone, the merger
was seen to herald in a new era of synergy and convergence. Second, it looked like Time
Warner shareholders had gotten the better of the deal. After all, they had gotten a 55/45
split on a 65/35 valuation. In fact, an AOL board member had raised this issue during the
board meeting approving the merger. 140 In contrast, Ted Turner, a Time Warner board
member and its largest shareholder, announced that he had voted for the merger “with as
much or more excitement and enthusiasm as I did when I first made love some forty-two
years ago.” 141 Third, it looked as if AOL was buying Time Warner. By taking fifty-five
percent of the new stock, AOL shareholders held ownership of a majority of the
company.
Levin’s approach to the merger was telling. At first, he had been adamant that
Time Warner shareholders get at least half of the new company. In time, however, he
relented. The merger, after all, was a combination of two companies into a completely
new company, and he was the new CEO. With him at the top and half of the board
controlled by Time Warner directors, Levin reassured himself that the merger was a
merger of equals. “I realized that it didn’t matter what the [share ratio] numbers were
because we were equals,” said Levin later. 142 A similar mindset can be seen in Levin’s
decision not to seek a “collar”—a contractual stipulation that the merger’s terms would
be recalculated if either stock dropped below a certain price before the merger’s
consummation. Levin thought that a collar would signal uncertainty or doubt in the
merger and the joint vision that led to it. 143 Ultimately, the lack of a collar would lead
Time Warner shareholders to suffer enormous losses in the year between the merger’s
announcement and its closure. It seems that to Levin, the only requirement of the deal
was that he—and an approximation of his board—retain control over the new venture.
Levin’s intention was to infuse AOL’s Internet savvy and stock market success
into a somewhat moribund Time Warner. And he thought he would be the one to oversee
it. The only significant spat between him and Case was over Case’s role; Levin tried to
force Case into a “non-executive” chairmanship despite Case’s claims that they had
agreed to the contrary. 144 But Case was willing to leave the day-to-day control to Levin,
and Levin responded by putting AOL managers in charge of much of the company.
Pittman was handed operating control over the growth areas of the new company: AOL,

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 144.
Id. at 150-56.
SWISHER, supra note 1, at 145. Interestingly, the AOL board member was Franklin Raines.
MUNK, supra note 1, at 179.
Id. at 153.
SWISHER, supra note 1, at 142.
MUNK, supra note 1, at 167-69.
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Time, Inc., Time Warner Cable, HBO, TBS and the WB network. 145 Parsons, on the
other hand, was in charge of the Warner Brothers and New Line Studios, Warner Music,
the trade publishing house, and human resources. 146 The allocation clearly indicated that
Pittman was Levin’s heir apparent. Throughout the rest of the executive ranks, AOL
executives got the nod over their Time Warner counterparts. 147 AOL CFO Mike Kelly
became CFO of the new company. 148 AOL advertising executives like Berlow and
Colburn were given free rein to institute AOL’s aggressive policies across the company.
In fact, Colburn’s team had T-shirts printed up saying, “Putz, we are.” 149 The T-shirt
quoted Colburn’s response to a comment from a horrified Time Warner executive:
“You’re making it sound as if you’re buying us.” 150
With their ascendance to power, the AOL team brought a new focus on delivering
shareholder value. Many at AOL thought their Time Warner counterparts had been lazy,
boring, complacent, and unfocused. 151 AOL, on the other hand, was known for meeting
and beating its performance goals, even when such goals were extremely aggressive.
AOL executives knew that to be rewarded by Wall Street, they had to consistently beat
Wall Street’s consensus estimates. 152 Pittman was legendary for his ability to set and
deliver “outlandish” revenue and earnings targets. 153 Time Warner, on the other hand,
had a reputation for not playing the game with much enthusiasm. Levin and the AOL
folks thought they could implant the target-focused culture to the Time Warner divisions
and immediately bring the stock up in price.
As part of this infusion, Levin also agreed to get rid of the Time Warner employee
cash bonus plan in exchange for AOL’s employee stock option plan. Under the old plan,
Time Warner employees were rewarded for meeting or beating internal goals and
incentives. However, at AOL, employees were rewarded with stock to better align their
interests with the shareholders. 154 At first, the change intrigued Time Warner employees,
who had heard about the riches earned at AOL. However, as the stock began to drop, so
did employees’ feelings about the new plan, and their views on the merger soured as
well. As one commentator noted, “all of corporate morale was tied much too closely with
AOL Time Warner’s stock price.” 155
That stock price would eventually take a tumble. After the merger was announced in
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 191-92; SWISHER, supra note 1, at 164.
MUNK, supra note 1, at 192.
Id. at 191.
SWISHER, supra note 1, at 165.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 149.
MUNK, supra note 1, at 200.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 202. One AOL executive related this anecdote:
Bob Pittman told David Colburn, Myer Berlow, and the others, “Go out and bring back what I
tell you to.” It’s like the flying monkeys coming out of the f[***]ing castle in The Wizard of Oz.
You know, they’d send the flying monkeys out every quarter and they brought back Dorothy,
and without that you don’t have AOL and a market cap of $200 billion plus.

Id.
154. SWISHER, supra note 1, at 178-79.
155. Id. at 180.
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January 2000, the Internet stock boom ended with a bang in March. A rash of Internet
companies saw their stock prices fall and their investor funding dry up. Since many of
these companies were AOL advertising clients, their downfalls would presumably hurt
AOL as well. Throughout 2000, however, AOL executives, including Pittman and Case,
reported that their advertising revenues continued to climb. In response to the industry
shake-up, they argued the downturn drove a “flight to quality” from which AOL
benefited. 156 Despite these assertions, AOL stock still took a hit: by November 2000,
AOL’s stock price had fallen off fifty percent from its January high. 157 As it turned out,
the worst was yet to come.
D. After the Merger: The AOL Crash and Time Warner Ascendance
After the merger was finalized in January 2001, the AOL executives now in
charge of the new company pressed employees to carry out their reforms. The executives
were often frustrated by the intransigence they encountered from Time Warner
employees, who were set on continuing in the old ways. In the former Time Warner, the
company was organized around its divisions, with division performance being the crucial
indicia of success. 158 As a result, the divisions often fiercely competed with one another,
even if it meant that the company overall lost some of the benefits of synergy. The AOL
folks, on the other hand, believed in the value of synergy and looked at the firm’s overall
share price as the ultimate goal. In addition, Time Warner employees believed in the
importance of long-term values and relationships. Getting the best deal might become
secondary if it meant cutting off ties with a valued customer or supplier. AOL, on the
other hand, had always focused on getting the most money possible at any given point in
time.
One example of this culture clash was a dispute over the company’s relationship
with American Airlines. American had long been one of Time’s biggest advertisers, and
Time Warner employees had always flown American (at discounted rates) when
traveling. 159 In 2001, however, American resisted renewing its advertising contract with
AOL. So the new leadership proposed dumping its long-standing ties to American in
favor of a new cross-divisional deal with United. Old Time Warner executives railed
against the deal, calling it a short-sighted move that would alienate a trusted client. But
the deal with United went through—and was trumpeted by the company as an example of
convergence. 160
The positive press for Pittman and his team continued through 2001, but the share
price continued to fall. 161 Internally, the company was getting signals that its aggressive
revenue targets would fall far short. 162 However, the company ultimately decided not to
revise those targets. Whatever chance it had of meeting them ended with the September
11th terrorist attacks. The attacks sent the economy into a downturn, and with it went
156. MUNK, supra note 1, at 204-05.
157. Id. at 208. Had the merger been negotiated in November, Time Warner shareholders would have held
65% of the combined equity value, and AOL shareholders 35%. Id. at 208-09.
158. KLEIN, supra note 7, at 249.
159. MUNK, supra note 1, at 233.
160. Id. at 234.
161. Id. at 234, 237.
162. Id. at 235.
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AOL Time Warner’s advertising revenue. In late September, the company admitted that it
would miss its 2001 goals by a wide mark. 163
CEO Gerald Levin was also changed after the attacks. Instead of going along with
the Pittman program, Levin began to resist it. He told his employees that the news
divisions should spend whatever they needed to cover the crisis. 164 The company had a
“fundamental moral responsibility,” he wrote in an email, to the goals of journalistic
independence and democratic dialogue. 165 When others within the company pressed him
on the earnings failures, he dismissed such business matters as unimportant in light of the
changed world. As he reported later, Levin began to perceive Case as an “automation”
who was unable to connect with national events. 166 Case, for his part, was frustrated with
Levin’s sudden lack of concern for the company’s shareholders. 167 He began an internal
campaign to force Levin out. 168
Levin soon departed; in December 2001, he announced his resignation. 169 But he
was succeeded by Parsons, rather than Pittman, in a sign that AOL’s dominance was
beginning to come to an end. 170 In a January 2002 statement, Parsons told Wall Street
that the company would not try to “over-promise” and would focus on building “longterm value.” 171 The announcement was paired with another disappointing earnings
report. The bad news continued throughout 2002. The company reported a massive $99
billion write-off in goodwill and disclosed a staggeringly bad agreement with
Bertelsmann AG that required AOL to buy back AOL Europe (a joint venture between
AOL and Bertelsmann) at a grossly inflated price. 172 In April, Pittman was reassigned to
AOL to restore the success of that unit. But his tenure was short-lived. On July 18
Pittman left the company.
That same day, the Washington Post began a series of articles by reporter Alec
Klein about misleading and potentially illegal advertising and accounting practices within
AOL from 2000 to 2001. 173 In essence, the articles alleged that AOL had doctored its
advertising revenue by pre-booking revenue, overvaluing advertising contracts, and
treating contractual “barter” as ad revenue. The most prominent example was a deal
between AOL and PurchasePro.com, a Las Vegas software maker. Through a complex
contract, AOL was able to declare $30 million in advertising revenue by granting certain
163. Id. at 247.
164. MUNK, supra note 1, at 244, 248.
165. Id. at 244.
166. Id. at 247.
167. Id. at 249-50.
168. KLEIN, supra note 7, at 269-74.
169. MUNK, supra note 1, at 253. A February 2003 New York Times article reported that after leaving Time
Warner, Levin moved to Marina del Rey to live with Laurie Perlman, a clinical psychotherapist he met in June
2002. Leslie Cauley, After a Tense Exit, Levin Tells His Side, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2003, at C6. He has filed for
divorce from his wife of 32 years. Levin told the reporter: “I want to be known as a social activist in education
and mental health and, eventually, a writer.” Id.
170. Levin convinced the board that Parsons should succeed him as CEO. KLEIN, supra note 7, at 278.
171. MUNK, supra note 1, at 259.
172. Id. at 260-61.
173. Alec Klein, Unconventional Transactions Boosted Sales; Amid Big Merger, Company Resisted DotCom Collapse, WASH. POST, July 18, 2002, at A1; Alec Klein, Unorthodox Partnership Produced Financial
Gains; Deals Allowed AOL, PurchasePro.com to Boost Revenue, WASH. POST, July 19, 2002, at A17; Alec
Klein, Creative Transactions Earned Team Rewards, WASH. POST, July 19, 2002, at A1.
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PurchasePro stock warrants to AOL. 174 But as the PurchasePro CEO later claimed, the
warrants really had nothing to do with advertising revenue; they had been in fact created
simply to give AOL the appearance of immediate revenue. 175 The articles catalogued a
number of other misleading and potentially illegal accounting practices that had helped to
boost AOL’s earnings at a critical time.
One week after the first article came out, Parsons announced that the SEC was
investigating the company’s accounting practices. The stock price cratered to $8.70, a
drop of 85% in just over a year. 176 Colburn was fired, his locks were changed, and his
files hauled away to be investigated. 177 The merger was now officially a disaster. As
AOL executives resigned or were ushered out, Time Warner executives stepped in to
assume control. 178 Under fire from the board, employees, and major investors, Case
resigned in January 2003. 179 In October 2003, the company was renamed “Time
Warner,” and its stock symbol changed from “AOL” back to “TWX.” 180
IV. LESSONS: THE PERILS OF PRIMACY AND THE CONSTANCY OF CULTURE
A. The Perils of Primacy
The logic of shareholder primacy is persuasive. Shareholders, it is argued, are the
most vulnerable of the corporate stakeholders. Being residual claimants, they are entitled
to payment only after everyone else’s claims have been satisfied. It therefore makes sense
to try to maximize their net wealth at the end of the day. After all, by design, satisfying
shareholders is only possible if all of the other constituencies have been satisfied, at least
to the extent of their contractual claims. Maximizing shareholder wealth means, again by
design, that societal wealth has been maximized as well.
Moreover, it also makes sense to encourage employees to think like shareholders.
The separation of ownership and control means that shareholders must sit passively by
while others use their money to run the corporation. The principal-agent problems are
obvious: if shareholders cannot monitor or discipline the executives running the show,
then there will be opportunities for the executives to siphon off money in a variety of
contexts. If executives think like shareholders, on the other hand, their interests will be

174. KLEIN, supra note 7, at 206.
175. PurchasePro’s CEO has since been indicted for securities fraud; he has pled not guilty to the charges.
John G. Edwards, Ex-PurchasePro Boss Pleads Guilty, Faces Trial, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Jan. 25, 2006,
available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2005/Jan-26-Wed-2005/business/25736072.html.
176. MUNK, supra note 1, at 272.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 273 (“By the late summer of 2002, almost every senior AOL executive had been fired, forced
out, or marginalized.”).
179. SWISHER, supra note 1, at 260. Case now heads Revolution, a private holding company with majority
stakes in several health care companies. Nina Munk, Steve Case’s New Act: You’ve Got Revolution!, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2005, at 5. Case appears to be back in the mode of his early days at AOL. See id. (“It struck me
that Revolution might be a good name, because it does sort of summarize what we’re trying to bring to bear,
which is not an incremental, tweaking kind of thing, but really to take some risks and swing for the fences and
to have a transformative impact on society . . . .”).
180. Dan
Ackman,
AOL
Nixes
AOL,
Keeps
X,
FORBES.COM,
Sept.
19,
2003,
http://www.forbes.com/2003/09/19/cx_da_0919topnews.html.
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“aligned” with ownership, and the company will act more efficiently. 181
The AOL of the late 1990s took these lessons to heart. It made shareholder value
its corporate mission, and it deputized its employees through generous stock options. The
strategy worked, at least on Wall Street. AOL grew from roughly $2 a share in 1997 to
more than $95.81 a share just before the merger. 182 It is truly remarkable that AOL—a
company only fifteen years old—could be the majority partner in a merger with massive
media conglomerate Time Warner. It only could do so because of its success in driving
up its own stock price.
AOL’s employee stock option program was also extremely effective in
motivating employees toward that goal. The fabulous wealth of executives and the small
fortunes of lower-level employees encouraged everyone to hop on the stock option
bandwagon. As one AOL employee later put it, “The whole culture at AOL was share
price, share price, share price. Why else were we in business?” 183 This mindset seemed
to have its desired effects, as employees did everything they could to meet the marketoriented revenue and earnings targets set by AOL leadership. 184
If the AOL mindset represented the “yin” of shareholder primacy, Time Warner
represented the “yang.” Time Warner focused on the importance of the institution. Even
within the company, employees fought hard not for the overall corporate entity, but for
their particular divisions. Long-term relationships were prized above the best deal that
might have been available at any given time. And Time Warner leadership was not
particularly solicitous of shareholder concerns. After all, Time had forced the Warner
merger down its shareholders’ throats, in the face of an extremely attractive tender offer
from Paramount. Even at its founding, Henry Luce had declared that shareholders, while
important, were no more important than the public interest in the operation of a
journalistic enterprise. 185 Perhaps as a reflection of this indifference, Time Warner’s
share price languished throughout most of the 1990s, despite the company’s obvious
strengths in the growth areas of cable, media, and entertainment.
Time Warner CEO Gerald Levin was looking for some of AOL’s stock price
mojo when he agreed to the merger between the two companies. He had hoped to inject
some of AOL’s creative DNA into his seemingly behind-the-times institution. But what
he actually got is instructive, and it points up some of the dangers in a corporate
philosophy of shareholder primacy.
First, AOL had been ruthlessly effective in keeping its share price rising higher
and higher. How did it do this? Of course, AOL did have a dominant product in a hot
industry. But perhaps more importantly, AOL—under the leadership of Robert Pittman—
was all about making its earnings numbers. AOL did what it took to meet and beat
analysts’ quarterly and yearly earning projections. “Are you going to make your
numbers?” was the question asked of AOL division heads. And AOL did make its
numbers—and surpass them.
181. Jensen & Murphy, supra note 54. This “call to arms” would later “reverberate[] in the counsels of
compensation consultants.” LOWENSTEIN, supra note 58, at 15.
182. MUNK, supra note 1, at 115, 151; see also SWISHER, supra note 1, at 267 (noting that $1000 invested
in AOL stock in 1992 would have been worth $58,000 in 2003, even after the 2001 crash).
183. MUNK, supra note 1, at 222-23.
184. See KLEIN, supra note 7, at 168 (“Employees came to call themselves ‘options whores.’”).
185. MUNK, supra note 1, at 3.
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Generally, a corporation should look to meet its earnings estimates. Like any
goal, earnings estimates can drive employees to work harder to meet a tangible measure
of achievement. AOL employees worked very hard—one executive compared life at
AOL to driving a motorcycle with your hair on fire. 186 But the estimates also encourage
employees and executives to cheat, if necessary, to meet them, and it is also clear that
AOL executives and employees cheated. When hard work was not enough, AOL relied
on techniques such as backdating contracts, moving revenue forward, moving expenses
back, and re-jiggering its advertising deals on the fly. As with many companies in the
1990s, the leadership either encouraged or turned a blind eye to such tactics. 187
These schemes were not like the traditional principal-agent conflict in which the
agent is stealing from the principal. After all, the stockholders at that time were the
primary beneficiaries of these accounting maneuvers. The trick here was that executives
and employees, through their stock and stock options, had the same incentives as the
public stockholders. The purpose of AOL’s malfeasance was to keep the stock price
going up, perhaps in large part so that employee options would become more valuable.
But if the schemes had never been discovered, AOL stockholders would have been quite
happy about them, at least from a purely self-interested perspective. Everyone at the
company would have won.
But this kind of “shareholder wealth maximization” is probably not what
shareholder primacists have in mind. Certainly, it cannot be societally efficient for
companies to achieve financial success through accounting chicanery. Primacists might
argue that, although such illegality may work in the short term, it will generally be a
losing strategy in the long term. Eventually, reported earnings will diverge so
significantly from reality that a cheating company will be forced to acknowledge the
disparity, and this confession will end up doing far more damage to the company than
short-term benefits from illegality. Shareholder primacy is not about today’s stock price,
they would say; it is about maximizing returns to shareholders over time. As Kraakman
and Hansmann contend, “corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term
shareholder value.” 188 Even if the AOL executives appeared to be shareholder
primacists, they were at best heretics—believers who had strayed from the path by
following a twisted version of the true faith.
Such a view ignores the realities of not only the market, but of shareholder
primacy as well. The relentless short-term focus of the markets, particularly in the late
1990s, encouraged a limited horizon with respect to share value. 189 AOL executives were

186. MUNK, supra note 1, at 117.
187. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 58, at 62 (noting that “number games were becoming a pervasive part of the
culture [of the 1990s boom]”).
188. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10, at 439 (emphasis added).
189. As Bill Bratton has argued:
For equity investors in recent years, the practice of shareholder value maximization has not meant
patient investment. Instead, it has meant obsession with short-term performance numbers. For
managers, the shareholder value norm accordingly has come to mean more than astute investment
and disinvestment. It also means aggressive management of reported figures responsive to the
investment community's demands for immediate value.
William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1284 (2002).
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keenly aware that missing one quarterly earnings estimate might have changed the
dynamic of their share price. To focus on maximizing shareholder value, managers had to
focus—and still must focus—on meeting Wall Street expectations. 190 The market
controls the price of the stock, and shareholder-primacy managers must therefore cater to
the desires of the market.
Of course, the market price should reflect the actual value of the company.
Proponents of the efficient capital market hypothesis posit that the market takes shortterm and long-term value into account in determining a company’s stock price at any
particular moment in time. 191 Managing for the short-term should be a losing market
strategy; the market should discount such near-sightedness and reward longer-thinking
firms with higher stock prices. In the 1990s technology boom, however, companies were
rewarded for meeting their short-term goals. As the AOL experience so amply
demonstrates, it is good for your stock—for years at a time—to be focused on meeting
Wall Street’s short-term expectations.
Moreover, it is difficult to give much content to a shareholder wealth maximization
norm that truly focuses on the long term. After all, even folks like Gerald Levin insist that
their decisions will ultimately end up maximizing shareholder wealth in the long term. If
the long term is long term enough, then the notion of a long-term shareholder wealth
maximization norm becomes fairly meaningless. As others have argued, a short-term
focus may be an endemic part of shareholder primacy. 192
As a complement to the short-term focus of the market as a whole, stock options
also encourage employees to act like short-term investors. 193 Most employee stock
options have a certain vesting period during which the options are not exercisable.
However, once an employee has been at the company a few years, these options will
begin to vest, perhaps with a different set of options vesting each year thereafter. 194 To
diversify their holdings, financially prudent employees will immediately cash out on their

190. See, e.g., LOWENSTEIN, supra note 58, at 29 (“Executives became acutely sensitive to what would
make their stocks rise, not over the long term but by the hour.”); Bratton, supra note 189, at 1284.
191. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the
Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 407 n.6 (2001) (noting that an interpretation of the hypothesis holds
that the markets are “‘fundamental value efficient,’ meaning that absent contradictory private information,
today's stock price represents the best possible estimate of the long-term, as well as the short-term, value of the
shareholders' stock”).
192. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT 4-5
(2001) (arguing that shareholder wealth maximization “keeps managers’ and stockholders’ focus on the short
term”); Margaret M. Blair, Directors’ Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 885, 890-95 (2003) (contending that “the mantra of share value maximization has no distinctive
meaning and policy implications if it is not interpreted to mean maximization of short-term value”).
193. Michael Lewis, The Artist in the Gray Flannel Pajamas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000, (Magazine), at 45,
46-47.
Many corporate employees behave less like old-fashioned workers than they do like investors.
Rather than think, I need to stay here and do my best because I have an investment in this
company, they think, I am going to keep a close eye on this ship, in case it starts to sink and my
options become worthless.
Id.
194. Klein reports that AOL employees were typically given a major grant of stock options upon hiring that
took four years to vest. KLEIN, supra note 7, at 168.

BODIE FINAL - SMF.DOC

998

9/14/2006 11:00:18 AM

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Summer

options and reinvest. Thus, employees are encouraged to think like short-term
shareholders; they want the stock price to stay high up until their options vest. 195 AOL
employees and executives apparently followed this pattern. Stephen Case cashed out on
extremely large holdings during his tenure as CEO. 196 In 2001, while he was still COO,
Pittman sold almost all of his AOL Time Warner stock. 197 In contrast, Henry Luce never
sold his shares of Time, Inc. and died holding fifteen percent of the company’s stock. 198
At AOL as well as many other dot-com companies, the cycle was clear:
executives push to meet short-term targets; investors push up the price of the stock; and
executives (and other employees) cash out on the options. 199 The cycle continues until
the company can no longer meet its targets, but cheating can prolong the process. Perhaps
that is why there was so much cheating at the end of the 1990s boom. Like desperate
gamblers, executives relied on accounting tricks to keep their hot streaks alive, in the
hopes that they could make up for their losses in future quarters. But the losses just kept
mounting until the tricks were no longer enough. 200
It may seem unfair to blame this cycle on shareholder primacy. But the cycle is a
natural product of both the ends of a primacy philosophy (shareholder wealth
maximization) as well as the means to achieving those ends (stock options and a focus on
making the numbers). 201 Indeed, perhaps AOL did succeed in maximizing shareholder
wealth. After all, its stock jumped astronomically from 1990 to 2000, based not only on
the Internet boom but also on the methods instituted by Pittman to manage advertising
revenue. Then, before the crash, AOL latched on to Time Warner and agreed to a merger
without a stock-price collar. Although AOL Time Warner plummeted in value after the
merger, surely AOL shareholders would have borne much more of the brunt of this fall
absent the merger. Despite the post-merger losses, Tele-Communications, Inc. CEO and
AOL shareholder John Malone still said, “Steve [Case] was fabulous for his shareholders.
They should build a statue to this guy.” 202
B. The Constancy of Culture
In comparison, Time Warner shareholders cannot be too happy about the
financial impact of the merger. For those who were originally Time shareholders, they
watched as the company dodged a generous Paramount tender offer to conduct a
generous buyout of Warner shareholders. The AOL merger must have seemed at first like
a blessed turnaround; when announced, Time Warner shareholders were getting a more
generous slice of the post-merger company than their equity warranted. But the market

195. Cf. id. (noting that a popular term among employees was “FYIV,” which stood for, “F[***] you, I’m
vested.”).
196. MUNK, supra note 1, at 276 (“[I]n the decade since AOL had gone public, Case had exercised and sold
about $700 million worth of AOL stock options.”).
197. Id. at 229.
198. Id. at 230. Luce’s wife once asked him if it was a mistake to have all of their financial eggs, so to
speak, in one basket. “It’s all right,” he answered, “as long as it’s my basket.” Id.
199. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 58, at 226 (arguing that the stock option, with its inevitable short-term
focus, “is at the root of all that went wrong” and “is the period’s original sin”).
200. See id. at 77 (“The odd fact about cooking the books is that the day of reckoning always comes.”).
201. Id. at 217-19.
202. SWISHER, supra note 1, at 242.
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soon changed that, and the deal went through with the valuation roughly flipped. Without
a collar to protect their share values, shareholders again had to watch helplessly as Levin
marched forward with a now financially disadvantageous merger. 203 By 2003, the AOL
disaster had sucked $200 billion away from the valuation of the companies at the time of
the merger. 204 It is no wonder Time Warner shareholders felt robbed.
From the perspective of Time Warner the institution, however, the outlook is not
so bleak. Time, Inc. has managed to merge with three separate companies—Warner
Communications, Turner Broadcasting, and AOL—and swallow them into the Time
“culture.” Each of those companies had its own imperious CEO, its own distinctive
corporate culture, and a valuation that surpassed the original Time, Inc. Yet Time
managed to stay in control. At the current company, Richard Parsons is the CEO; once
rumored to be an interim caretaker, he is now ensconced for the foreseeable future.205
Time Warner executives Don Logan and Jeff Bewkes have ascended to the most
important managerial positions within the company. 206 Steve Ross, Steve Case, and
Robert Pittman are gone; Ted Turner has been marginalized.
Perhaps the most instructive lesson came at the expense of Carl Icahn. Icahn, a
significant shareholder in Time Warner, agitated for managerial changes to improve the
company’s languishing share price. 207 Key to Icahn’s goals was a break-up of the
company. In a report commissioned by Icahn, investment and consulting company
Lazard argued that the company should be split into four pieces. 208 The report was
unveiled at a press conference with much hoopla, and Icahn announced he would wage a
proxy fight against the board if they failed to act on his plan. 209 The report, however, was
a flop. 210 Icahn ultimately reached a compromise with Time Warner on a stock buyback
plan, but the Wall Street consensus is that he lost. Lazard CEO Bruce Wasserstein has
also seen his reputation tarnished. 211 For his part, Parsons dismissed the notion that
Icahn’s plan would improve the company: “[I]f we broke up the company, would Warner
Bros. make better movies? Would the magazines be better?” 212 And he cited once more
to Time Warner’s higher purpose: “[I]f the goal is only financial, what about the notion
of journalistic integrity?” 213
To the extent that “culture” means continuing control by the company’s
203. As one commentator opined at the time, “Time Warner must feel like a girl who agreed to marry a guy
for his money, found out he wasn't nearly as rich as she thought, and then noticed he's ugly, too.” Dan Ackman,
Top of the News: AOL Time Warner’s Tragic Marriage, FORBES.COM, Jan. 12, 2001,
http://www.forbes.com/2001/01/12/0112topaol.html.
204. See Ackman, supra note 180 (“Since the merger, the company has lost over $200 billion in market
value . . . .”).
205. See David Carr, Dick Parsons Knows What You Think, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2005, at C1, C7 (noting
that Parsons “may have engineered one of the biggest turnarounds in recent history . . . .”).
206. David Carr, No Use Crying Over Spilled Billions, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2005, at Business 1, 4.
207. Ken Auletta, The Raid, NEW YORKER, Mar. 20, 2006, at 132.
208. Id. at 142.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 142-43.
211. Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Adviser Who Became the Activist, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at B1 (noting
that Lazard’s involvement in Icahn’s “failed fight . . . may have exposed him as Wall Street’s Emperor With No
Clout.”).
212. Auletta, supra note 207, at 134.
213. Id.
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executives, Time has imposed its culture over this burgeoning corporate entity. Ideally, of
course, culture means more than control. Culture is an ethos, an approach, a
methodology, a way of doing business. Time has consistently represented that it places
primary importance on a culture of “journalistic integrity.” I am in no position to assay
whether the current stable of Time Warner media properties lives up to the standards of
Henry Luce. But to the extent that Time Warner employees brought a different ethos to
the merger than the AOL employees, it is the Time Warner ethos that appears to have
triumphed. After the merger, when AOL executives were placed in key positions of
control throughout the company, they were exasperated by the culture of the Time
Warner employees. These employees placed a premium on long-term relationships, rather
than getting the best deal. They fought for their divisions, rather than thinking broadly
about the company as a whole. They valued institutions like their corporate library and
their employee perks. Former AOL Time Warner ad executive Myer Berlow summed up
his feelings about Time Warner employees this way: “To them, it’s all about status; it’s
not about money. Anyone who believes it’s about money is really looked down upon.” 214
In contrast, by the time of the merger, AOL employees had lost their religious
fervor about AOL, the product. Initially, many employees, including Case himself, had
been loathe to foist advertising on AOL customers. In the late 1990s, however, the huge
influx of advertising cash washed this attitude away. Instead of exalting the techies who
developed the critical software and customer support, the company lionized the
advertising and business affairs departments. Perhaps as a result, the company has lost
the product dominance it once maintained. In her suggestions for revitalizing AOL, Wall
Street Journal reporter Kara Swisher lists thirteen “easy steps” for revitalizing AOL. 215
Almost all of them concern AOL’s loss of focus on the quality of its online service. 216
Taking a step back, it seems easy to answer which company has been more
successful. Time Warner continues to influence the world with its numerous media
properties; it recently announced a joint purchase of Adelphia cable properties with
Comcast Cable. 217 Although I make no claim about the beneficence of Time Warner’s
actual cultural impact, the company clearly exerts a powerful influence on our society.
AOL, on the other hand, has been reduced to a division within Time Warner; its online
service is still struggling for a role in an increasingly broadband world. Can we really say
that AOL has given more to society if it has given a greater return on value to its
shareholders? Is this metric the only way to measure corporate success? The AOL Time
Warner merger seems to provide strong evidence to the contrary.
So, perhaps that is the ultimate lesson—the importance of having a corporate
“culture” beyond simply maximizing shareholder value. Somewhere in the 1990s, AOL
lost its missionary zeal for changing the world through its incredible technology. Instead,

214. MUNK, supra note 1, at 240. Berlow concluded his thought by saying: “Well, what the f[***] else
matters when you’re in business?” Id.
215. SWISHER, supra note 1, at 278.
216. See id. at 278-94 (discussing problems such as “lack of passion,” “lack of product innovation,” “loss
of community roots,” “diminution of brand,” and “AOL’s place in the digital lifestyle”). Swisher ends her book
with a note of hope, saying that one AOL executive, Ted Leonisis, was “still in love—and it was a profound
love—with the digital future and the promise it might still bring.” Id. at 294.
217. Annalisa Burgos, Time Warner, Comcast Buying Adelphia in $17.6B Deal, FORBES.COM, Apr. 21,
2005, http://www.forbes.com/markets/2005/04/21/cx_ab_0421video1.html.
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executives and employees fell to worshipping the false god of share price. But a higher
share price should be a byproduct of a successful company, not its end. Perhaps this
notion is the greatest falsehood of shareholder primacy: that the company itself—its
people, its culture, its purpose—does not matter. Time, Inc. has often stood for the
contrary. And its longevity—perhaps, even, its success—asks us to rethink whether
shareholder wealth maximization should really be the ultimate arbiter of corporate value.
V. CONCLUSION: A CAUTIONARY NOTE
Of course, the failure of one company does not a revolution make. It could quite
plausibly be argued that the corporate improprieties at AOL and AOL Time Warner
reflected at most a pathology endemic to a particular normative system. Perhaps
shareholder-primacy companies are more prone to overstate earnings, have generous
stock option packages, and focus excessively on the short term. But any approach to
corporate governance will have pathologies that stem from the weaknesses of that
approach. A company based on employee primacy, for example, might be prone to
overpay its employees, or it may descend into a morass of internal bickering over basic
decisions. 218
Time Warner itself may be seen as representative of a management-primacy
pathology. The company has consistently ignored the interests of its shareholders in
making its most important decisions about its future. The decision to escape the
Paramount tender offer by overpaying Warner shareholders remains an oft-criticized
episode of corporate hubris. The later decision to merge with AOL and forgo the stockprice collar ultimately cost Time Warner shareholders billions of dollars. Nor was the
merger popular with Time Warner employees. In fact, Time Warner management
continues to be criticized for its handling of company matters. 219 Time Warner is no
paragon of corporate virtue nor a model for corporate governance.
However, the perils of excess managerialism have been well documented and are
what led to the “shareholder primacy” revolution of the 1970s and 1980s. My hope for
this narrative is that the AOL Time Warner merger may now stand as one data point
reflecting potential problems of excessive shareholder wealth maximization. The
experience of AOL, along with other busts from the 1990s like Enron, WorldCom,
Global Crossing, and Computer Associates, vividly demonstrates the danger of
shareholder primacy as an organizing principle for corporations and corporate law. 220 If

218. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 89-90 (1996) (arguing that “employees are
far more likely than investors to differ among themselves concerning the firm’s policies”). Daniel Greenwood
has argued, however, that the shareholder primacy norm encourages, rather than merely permits, such
pathologies. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good Corporations Go Bad, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
773, 775 (“The single-valued profit maximization ethos of the share-centered corporation demands that
managers teach themselves to exploit everyone around them. It is inevitable that some will learn this lesson so
well that they will exploit even those for whose benefit they are supposed to be exploiting.”).
219. See, e.g., Richard Siklos & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Icahn Plan For a Split Gets a Push, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2006, at C1 (discussing the Lazard report in favor of splitting up Time Warner against current
management’s wishes).
220. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 58, at 218 (noting that the “credo of shareholder value” led to an
obsessively short-termed focus, which in turn led to “[v]irtually every transgression” of the 1990s boom);
Bratton, supra note 189, at 1283 (“Like GE under Jack Welch, Enron under Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling pursued
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shareholder value is the central concern, then companies will jump through hoops to meet
Wall Street expectations. The pressure of meeting such expectations may push executives
into an excessively short-term focus and unethical or illegal accounting moves.
Moreover, shareholder primacy has been touted as a way of curbing managerial
discretion, making sure that executives do not take excessive rents from the true owners.
But with the advent of stock options, executives could mouth the scripture of
“shareholder value” while taking gargantuan slices of that value for themselves. A focus
on what is best for the shareholders became a focus on what was best for the share price
at the time the executives’ options were vesting.
AOL’s actions in pursuit of “shareholder primacy” may have worked to the
advantage of investors who bailed before 2001, but long-term investors suffered badly
from the company’s quarterly-earnings focus, and the corporation itself was reduced from
an Internet titan to a unit within a division of another company. Perhaps AOL’s
experience will serve as a cautionary note, not only to corporations but to corporate
scholars as well. The religion of shareholder primacy may offer a persuasive theology
and tantalizing rewards. But in the end, it is the worship of a false god.

maximum shareholder value.”).

